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ABSTRACT
The US DOE concept for facility in-situ decommissioning (ISD) is to physically stabilize and isolate in 
tact, structurally sound facilities that are no longer needed for their original purpose of, i.e., generating 
(reactor facilities), processing(isotope separation facilities) or storing radioactive materials.  The 105-R 
Disassembly Basin is the first SRS reactor facility to undergo the in-situ decommissioning (ISD) process.  
This ISD process complies with the105-R Disassembly Basin project strategy as outlined in the 
Engineering Evaluation / Cost Analysis for the Grouting of the R-Reactor Disassembly Basin at the 
Savannah River Site and includes:
 Managing residual water by solidification in-place or evaporation at another facility, 
 Filling the below grade portion of the basin with cementitious materials to physically stabilize the 
basin and prevent collapse of the final cap,
o Sludge and debris in the bottom few feet of the basin will be encapsulated between the 
basin floor and overlying fill material to isolate if from the environment.
 Demolishing the above grade portion of the structure and relocating the resulting debris to 
another location or disposing of the debris in-place and
 Capping the basin area with a concrete slab which is part of an engineered cap to prevent 
inadvertent intrusion.
The estimated total grout volume to fill the 105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin is 24,424 cubic meters or 
31,945 cubic yards.  Portland cement-based structural fill materials were design and tested for the reactor 
ISD project and a placement strategy for stabilizing the basin was developed.  Based on structural 
engineering analyses and work flow considerations, the recommended maximum lift height is 5 feet with 
24 hours between lifts.
Pertinent data and information related to the SRS 105-R-Reactor Disassembly Basin in-situ 
decommissioning include:  regulatory documentation, residual water management, area preparation 
activities, technology needs, fill material designs and testing, and fill placement strategy.  This 
information is applicable to decommissioning both the 105-P and 105-R facilities.  The ISD process for 
the entire 105-P and 105-R reactor facilities will require approximately 250,000 cubic yards (191,140 
cubic meters) of grout and 2,400 cubic yards (1,840 cubic meters) of structural concrete which will be 
placed over a twelve month period to meet the accelerated schedule ISD schedule.  The status and lessons 
learned in the SRS Reactor Facility ISD process will be described.
INTRODUCTION
The 105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin will be the first Savannah River Site (SRS) reactor facility to 
undergo the In-Situ Decommissioning (ISD) process.  The process consists of placing cementitious grout 
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materials below grade up to ground surface in the disassembly basin areas.  The above grade structure 
over the disassembly basin areas will be demolished and removed.  A concrete cap will cover the grouted 
area of the disassembly basin and this will be the final configuration.  
This in-situ decommissioning process complies with the105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin Project 
Strategy as outlined in the Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis for the Grouting of the R-Reactor 
Disassembly Basin [1] and the Removal Site Evaluation Report/Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis 
(RSER/EE/CA) for the 105-R Reactor Building Complex [2].
The SRS 105-P reactor facility is shown in Figure 1 and is very similar to 105-R building.  The ISD 
concept for both 105-P and 105-R are illustrated in schematic cross sections in Figures 2 and 3.  (The 
cross sections correspond to the red line on Figure 1.)
The 105 Reactor Disassembly Basin Grout Placement Strategy provides an initial data set for planning 
future in-situ reactor decommissioning projects and addresses the following topics:
1. 105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin Areas and Work Phases
2. Grout Mix Designs 
3. Grout Placement Strategy and Delivery System Configurations
4. Grout Placement Construction Verification Scheme 
Detailed information supporting the grout placement strategy is provided elsewhere [3].
Pertinent data and information related to grout formulations and concrete mix designs, placement strategy 
and concepts will also be applied to the decommissioning of the 105-P Reactor Disassembly Basin and to 
both the 105-P and 105-R Main Reactor Buildings.
Figure 1.  Photo of the 105-P reactor building (similar to the 105-R building).
       Dashed red line indicates the cross sections in Figures 2 and 3.
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Figure 2.  Cross-section through 105-P (105-R) reactor building before ISD.
Figure 3.  Cross-section through 105-P (105-R) reactor building after ISD.
Gray hatched areas are filled with zero bleed flowable fill (underwater fill in the VTS).
Red area is filled with 3000 psi concrete.  Yellow and orange hatched areas are special shrinkage 
compensating capping concrete containing an integral waterproofing admixture.
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BACKGROUND 
The Savannah River Site was built in the early 1950’s with the mission of producing special nuclear 
materials in a safe, efficient, and environmentally acceptable manner. The special nuclear materials were 
produced in five nuclear production reactors primarily for national defense. The production reactor of 
concern in the current analysis, designated R-Reactor was initially brought critical on December 28, 1953 
and operated intermittently until it was shutdown on June 15, 1964 due to reduced requirements for 
defense-related products.  Following shutdown, the R Reactor was de-fueled (all fissile materials were 
removed), and placed in cold shutdown with no capability of restart.  
In 2006, SRS Site Deactivation & Decommissioning (SDD) removed 90% of the water in the R-Reactor 
disassembly basin.  A small volume of water was left in the basin to provide shielding for irradiated scrap 
materials and sludge.  
The R Reactor Complex was designated to be decommissioned as part of a CERCLA remedial action 
with an assumed end state of “in situ decommissioning” because the reactor facility is structurally robust 
and complete demolition is not necessary.  The ISD objectives for the 105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin 
include [2]:
 Prevent industrial worker exposure to radioactive or hazardous contamination exceeding Principal 
Threat Source Material levels.
 Prevent industrial worker exposure to radioactive or hazardous contamination.
 Prevent the migration of radioactive or hazardous contaminants from the complex to the 
groundwater at concentrations that do not exceed regulatory standards to the extent practicable. 
 Prevent animal intruder exposure to radioactive or hazardous contamination.
APPROACH
The approach for developing the grout placement strategy was to:
 Assemble a team of on-site personnel with the appropriate skill mix
 Develop a CAD model and rapid prototype model of the basin to facilitate visualization of the 
facility and proposed work activities
 Group areas within the disassembly basin according to relevant conditions and stabilization needs
 Identify stabilization material requirements for the various areas in the disassembly basin
 Design cementitious fill materials that meet both the ISD requirements and construction needs.
 Test the cementitious materials to confirm material requirements are met.
 Identify construction verification activities to confirm that fill materials where needed.
 Support procurement of fill materials for the R-reactor disassembly basin and for the R-Reactor 
ISD.
105-R REACTOR DISASSEMBLY BASIN DESCRIPTION 
The 105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin consists of the twelve major, distinct areas which are listed below:
1. Maintenance Bay Pit & Sump
2. Seismic Gap 
3. D&E Utility Chase & Canal, 
4. Isolation Tank
5. Deep Well (3) [submerged within Machine Basins]
6. Vertical Tube Storage (VTS)
7. Machine Basins (3)
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8. Monitor Pin Basin
9. Dry Cave 
10. Horizontal Tube Storage (HTS) 
11. Transfer Pit
12. Maintenance Bay (remaining portion)
13. Emergency Basin (currently filled with soil and capped with concrete)
The 105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin is depicted in Figure 4 which provides the general locations for the 
designated areas.  The areas within disassembly basin range in depth from 51.25 to 5 ft. (Deep Wells and 
Maintenance Bay, respectively).  Approximately 30 inches of water remain in the VTS, HTS, Isolation 
Tank, Machine Basins, and Transfer Canals and provide shielding for irradiated metal debris which will 
be left in the basin.  Shielding water will be displaced during grouting activities and transferred to another 
facility for evaporation. The Emergency Basin Area, previously filled with clay and capped with concrete, 
is excluded from grouting activities. 
Figure 4.  105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin Areas.
A 3-D CAD model and rapid prototype model of the entire the 105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin were 
completed to facilitate the construction phase of this project [4].  These models were crucial in developing 
and visualizing the overall grout placement strategy and grout delivery system configuration.  
105-R REACTOR DISASSEMBLY BASIN ISD IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
Implementation of the ISD for the reactor disassembly basin consists of several work stages.  The 
numerous areas within the basin were grouped according to current conditions and fill material placement 
requirements.  Details of the R-Reactor Disassembly Basin closure strategy are provided elsewhere [3].  
This overview focuses on the first four physical stabilization stage (identified in sequential order) 
identified below.    
Plan View
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Dry Area Physical Stabilization 
The first areas that will be stabilized are currently dry, free of obstructions, and relatively easily accessed 
even though they are in some of the deepest parts of the basin.  Flowable grout will be used to fill these 
areas listed below:  
- Maintenance Bay Pit Sump (small volume about 22 cubic yards)
- Seismic Gap (-40 ft. to 0 ft. elevations)
- D&E Chase & Canal (-39 ft. to 0 ft. elevations)1
- Emergency Pump Suction Well (connected to VTS, near SE corner; small volume)
Wet Area Stabilization and Scrap Encapsulation  
Currently about 30 inches of water provide shielding of contaminated scrap in certain areas of the basin.  
This water will be displaced by an underwater grout. Approximately 5 ft. of flowable grout suitable for 
underwater placement (referred to as the Shielding Grout layer) will be used to fill the basin from the -30 
ft. to -25 ft. elevations.  
- 3-Deep Wells submerged within Machine Basins (-51.25 ft. to -30 ft. elevations)1
- VTS (sludge & debris layers)
- Isolation Tank (-30 ft. to -1.25 ft. elevations, residual water will be pumped to the VTS for 
subsequent treatment).
- Transfer Canal in the Dry Cave (-30 ft. to -25 ft. elevations) 
-  3-Machine Basins (-30 ft. to -25 ft. elevations)
- Miscellaneous Transfer Canal Segments in the HTS (-30 ft. to -25 ft.) and East and West Pits in 
the Transfer Pit (-30 ft. to -25 ft. and -21 ft. to -17 ft. elevations, respectively). 
Displaced Shielding Water Removal and Treatment  
The displaced water will be collected it in the VTS area and transfer it to the P Reactor Disassembly 
Basin for evaporation.  Selection of the treatment option was based on a decision by the SRS Area 
Completion Projects (ACP)/SDD after regulatory approval.
Remaining Dry Area Physical Stabilization
Flowable grout will be used to fill these areas listed below from the -17 ft. to -1.25 ft. elevation:
- VTS 
- HTS 
- Dry Cave 
- Transfer Pit 
- Monitor Pin Basin 
- Maintenance Bay (remaining portion at -5 ft. to -1.25 ft. elevations). 
Working Surface Construction
The top 1.25 feet of the basin will bee filled with a 3000 psi concrete which will serve as a working 
surface for the subsequent demolition.  
Superstructure Demolition
The above-grade disassembly basin structure, primarily walls and roof over the basin, will be demolished 
and disposed in a separate location for facility construction debris.
Engineered Cap Construction
An engineered cap will be installed over the reactor disassembly basin.  The cap will consist of a concrete 
slab.  The cap concrete is a shrinkage compensating formulation that contains an integral water proofing 
admixture to address potential cracks.
                                                
1 A camera survey in the Deep Wells and in the D&E Canal and Chase will be conducted during grouting.  
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R-REACTOR DISASSEMBLY BASIN STRUCTURAL FILL MATERIALS
Cementitious fill (grout) will be used to stabilize the disassembly basin.  The fill material requirements 
for the 105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin decommissioning activities include: 1) providing a radiological 
shielding layer over irradiated debris and sludge; 2) filling void volume to provide physical stabilization 
of the below-grade space for the ISD, and 3) providing a durable non radioactive surface for the 
superstructure demolition [2].  General characteristics of the grout fill materials include:
 Flowable
 Self-consolidating and leveling
 Minimal segregation / settling / phase separation
 > 50 psi unconfined compressive strength (support 50 psi overburden) [3].
A series of tests were identified to measure properties related to the desired characteristics of the R-
Reactor grouts.  The test methods and screening test criteria are listed in Table 1.  In addition to fill 
grouts, a 3000 psi concrete for the -1.25 to 0 ft. elevation working surface and a concrete for the basin cap 
are also required.  The 3000 psi concrete in the current SRS specification will be used in the top 15 inches 
of the basin.  A shrinkage compensating 3000 psi concrete containing an integral water proofing 
admixture has been specified for the cap.
Table 1.  Test Methods and Screening Criteria for R-Reactor Structural Fill Materials.
Property Test Methods Screening Criteria Basis
Flow ASTM D 6103 >10 inches Placement*
Slump-Flow ASTM C 1611 24 ± 4 inches Placement*
Underwater Slump-Flow ASTM C 1611 18 ± 4 inches Placement*
Bleed Water (segregation) ASTM C 232 0 after 24 hr. Placement,* Uniform Material
Set Time ASTM C 403 <24 hr.
Compressive Strength 
7 days
ASTM D 4832 >50 psi Self supporting
Saturated Hydraulic 
Conductivity
ASTM D 5084 < 1E-06 cm/s Less than clay 
Temperature Rise SRS Adiabatic calculations <35°C** Suitable for Mass Placement
Air Content ASTM C 231 <8 volume % Quality control
Unit Weight ASTM C 138 > 80 lbs / cu ft. > water
Yield ASTM C 138 1 ± 0.1 Balanced mix
* Minimize labor involved with placement.
** Semi adiabatic
The potential for hydrogen generation during placement was evaluated.2 The focus was on the rate at 
which aluminum alloys react in the with corrosive high pH portland cement based grout (pH >13) to 
produce hydrogen gas, thereby creating a potential hazardous deflagration/explosion condition in the 105-
R Reactor Disassembly Basin.3  The evaluation results are:
“The risk of accumulation of a flammable mixture of hydrogen above the surface of the water during placement 
of grout-CLSM into the R-Basin VTS disassembly area is very low.  Conservative calculations estimate that 
there is insufficient aluminum present in the basin VTS area to result in significant hydrogen evolution.”
                                                
2 A similar evaluation of the 105-P Reactor Disassembly Basin was completed resulting in the same 
3 Aluminum scrap metal debris will be left in the Vertical Tube Storage section of the disassembly basin as part of 
the reactor ISD.
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Laboratory testing was conducted to formulate grout mixes that are flowabe, pumpabe, self-
leveling, and have low heat of hydration characteristics to support mass grout placement.  The 
current suit of structural fills identified for the R-reactor Disassembly Basin ISD are provided in 
Table 2.  Relevant property data are also provided.  Over 95 volume percent of the basin will be 
filled the “bulk fill” mixes, PF-ZB-FF-8 and / PF-ZB-FF-8-D.  The underwater mix, PR-UZB-
FF-8 will be used to cover irradiated scrap metal that will be left in certain areas of the basin.  
This structural fill will provide shielding while the 30 inches of water currently covering the 
scrap are displaced upward and then pumped out of the basin for transfer to a remote site for 
evaporation.







(lbs / cu yd) PF-ZB-FF PF-ZB-FF-8 PF-ZB-FF-8-D PR-UZB-FF-8
Portland Cement
    Type I/II  150 150 150 150
Fly Ash
    Type F 500 500 500 500
Sand  (quartz)
    C-33 2318 1700 1850 1832
Gravel  (granite)
    No. 8 0 800 800 800
Water (lbs / cu yd)









HRWR maximum (fl. oz / cu yd)
Polycarboxylate polymer 120* 79* 79* 68**
VMA (g / cu yd)
Welan Gum 275 275 0 0
Duitan Gum 0 0 200 0
Set Accelerator maximum 
(gal / cu yd) 
Calcium nitrate based# 10 10 10 10
Properties
Flow D-6103 (inches) 11.5 11.5 13 9.5
Flow C 1611 (inches) Not measured 25 26 19
Set Time## (hr) < 24 < 24 < 24 <10 
Bleed Water 24 hr. 0 0 0 0
Unit Weight (lb/cuft) 127.5 134.5 137.5 135.8
Compressive Strength (ave. of 2)
7 days (psi) 160 200 Not measured 380 @ 14d
28 days (psi) 390 540 390  @ 14d 820
Temperature Rise  (calculated 
semi adiabatic)
<25° <25° <25° <25°
* SIKA Inc. Viscocrete 2100 and 6100 and W. R. Grace Inc. Advacast 575 were tested and found to 
be compatible with the gum VMA.  Compatibility was defined as being capable of forming a fluid 
slurry when premixed with the gum VMAs.
* * W.R. Grace Adva 405 was tested.  
#  As required to meet production needs. W. R. Grace Inc. DCI and SIKA Inc. SIKASET NC were 
tested.
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## Values for mixes without set accelerator.
The potential for hydrogen generation during grout operations was evaluated to address safety 
concerns related to interactions of residual metal scrap debris in the VTS in direct with contact 
with portland cement based fill material which has a pH of about 12.4 which is highly corrosive 
to aluminum metal and alloys [5].  This evaluation focused on the reactive metals – aluminum 
alloys reacting with corrosive high pH grout (grout-CLSM pH >13) resulting in hydrogen gas 
generation and creating a potential deflagration/explosion hazardous condition in the 105-R 
Reactor Disassembly Basin.  The evaluation results can be summarized as follows:
“The risk of accumulation of a flammable mixture of hydrogen above the surface of the 
water during placement of grout-CLSM into the R-Basin VTS disassembly area is very 
low.  Conservative calculations estimate that there is insufficient aluminum to present
in the basin VTS area to result in significant hydrogen evolution.”
Recommendations were provided to further minimize the potential for hydrogen evolution and 
are listed below:
1. Minimize the initial temperature of the water and grout-CLSM as much as practical.  
Lower temperatures will mean lower hydrogen generation rates.
2. Ventilate the building above the basin rim as much as practical (e.g., leave doors open) to 
further disperse hydrogen.
3. As much as possible, minimize interruptions to the grout-CLSM placement process.  
Interruptions will result in higher water temperatures and hence higher hydrogen evolution 
rates.
FILL PLACEMENT STRATEGY AND DELIVERY SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
The structural fill (grout) is will be procured through the existing SRS Site Concrete contract.  
LaFarge, Inc., the supplier, will batch the fill materials at the Jackson Ready Mix Plant which is 
about 40 minutes from R-Area.  The SRS site D&D work force will receive the materials in R-
Area pump the grout into the basin.  A delivery system consisting of several trunk lines, four-
inch slick lines, configured a series of valves and branch lines will be used for the bulk of the 
placements.  Two-inch lines will be used to fill a few of the small area.  
The strategy is to install trunk lines required for initial dry area placements and begin filling 
these areas while the remaining trunk lines and branches are installed in the remainder of the 
basin.  Only the grout trunk-slick lines for the areas being filled will be charged with grout at any 
one time.  The remaining lines will be isolated and capped until needed.  The lift height is limited 
to 5 feet in order to not overload walls and stop logs.  The set time of the fill material will be 
adjusted to meet the work schedule which in some cases may require daily 5 ft lifts in certain 
parts of the basin.  A set accelerator is required because the high range water reducers used in the 
quantity necessary to produce a flowable, zero bleed mix also result in delayed set times. 
Structural engineering analyses for several key areas were performed for the R-Disassembly 
Basin ISD and are summarized below:
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 The concrete slab adjacent to the western side of the Dry Cave shows signs of 
deterioration and structural engineering analysis recommends restricting floor live 
loads to less than 40 psf [6].  
 To alleviate a structural shear capacity issue for the D&E canal floor in an 
unsupported configuration,  the Chase underlying the D&E Canal underlying should 
be filled prior to filling the D&E Canal [7]
 The canal gates are not qualified for a 5-ft grout lift.  Consequently the gates should be 
opened before grouting.  Alternatively, assuming not deterioration of the gates, a 
maximum differential of 2 ft 6 should be maintained between lifts if the canal gates 
remains closed.
The grout filled disassembly basin will provide the heavy equipment working platform to initiate 
demolish activities of the above ground structure over the disassembly basin.  At the conclusion 
of the above ground structure demolition, a concrete cap will be installed over the grout filled 
disassembly basin and this serve as the final in-situ decommissioning project configuration for 
the 105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin.  
CONCLUSIONS
The 105-R Disassembly Basin is the first SRS reactor facility to undergo the in-situ decommissioning 
(ISD) process.  Approximately 24,424 cubic meters or 31,945 cubic yards of structural fill will be used to 
physically fill the 105-R Reactor Disassembly Basin.  Portland cement-based fill materials were 
developed and tested for this project.  The materials are structural fills which are flowable, zero bleed 
grouts that contain cement, Class F fly ash, sand and 3/8 inch granite gravel (No. 8 stone).  Results of a 
structural engineering study of the existing basin and test results for the selected materials were 
incorporated into the placement strategy which also addressed the desire for rapid completion. Based on 
structural engineering analyses and work flow considerations, the recommended maximum lift height is 5 
feet with 24 hours between lifts.
The materials will be produced by an off site concrete ready mix plant and trucked to R-Area at SRS 
where they will be received by site D&D and pumped into the basin.  Quality Control will be provided by 
USR Washington Group.  
The structural fills and placement strategy developed for the SRS R-Reactor Disassembly Basin are also 
applicable to decommissioning the P-Reactor Disassembly Basin and the below grade portions of both the 
105-P and 105-R facilities.  The ISD process for the entire 105-P and 105-R reactor facilities will require 
approximately 250,000 cubic yards (191,140 cubic meters) of grout and 2,400 cubic yards (1,840 cubic 
meters) of structural concrete which are expected to be placed on an accelerated schedule.  
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